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When allegedly comprehensive new legislation is enacted, courts often struggle 
to define the parameters of the new laws.  Terms undefined by the legislature need 
defining.  The policies behind the laws need explanation.  And standards of review 
need to be clarified.  Inevitably, the new laws will cause some confusion in the 
courts—a confusion that may linger for many years. 
Effective July 1, 1996, the Ohio legislature revised the state’s felony-sentencing 
guidelines.  Previously, there were almost no guidelines, only maximum and 
sometimes minimum penalties for offenses.  The new legislation, which is 
commonly referred to as Senate Bill 2,2 has received much attention in the courts.  
Scores of cases have interpreted various aspects of the guidelines.  As might be 
expected, these interpretations have not been entirely consistent.   
A case from the Ohio First District Court of Appeals in Hamilton County, on 
which I am a judge, illustrates some of the different interpretations of the new 
guidelines.  The case, State v. Mushrush, involved Christopher Mushrush, an 
eighteen-year-old with a drug problem.3  On April 23, 1998, he took a handful of 
pills, flipped out, and somehow ended up at a talent show at Oak Hills High School 
in Cincinnati.  In his drug-induced state, he released pepper spray into a crowd of 
about four hundred people.4   
As the cloud of spray spread through the auditorium, the crowd began to panic 
and rush to the exits. The spray affected two people in the crowd.  One, a sixteen-
year-old named Amanda Hartman, got the spray in her eyes and had difficulty 
                                                                
1Mark P. Painter, Judge, Ohio First District Court of Appeals, 1995-; Adjunct Professor of 
Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, 1990-; Judge, Hamilton County Municipal 
Court, 1982-95; B.A., University of Cincinnati, 1970; J.D., University of Cincinnati College 
of Law, 1973. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Richard J. 
Schaen, Esq.  
2Am. Sub. S.B. 2; see also Am. Sub. S.B. 269 (amending Senate Bill 2). 
3State v. Mushrush, 733 N.E.2d 252 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); discretionary appeal not 
allowed, 716 N.E.2d 1168 (1999). 
4Id. at 255. 
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breathing.  The other, Anna Weber, had a seizure and went into convulsions as her 
three children watched.5 
As the crowd scattered, Mr. Mushrush attempted to flee.  The school’s principal, 
James Williamson, grabbed him, but he got away after pushing Mr. Williamson.  The 
push caused Mr. Williamson to reinjure a knee.6  Ultimately, several people tackled 
Mr. Mushrush.  A struggle followed.  Mr. Mushrush bit the hand of Donald Weil, 
one of the people who had caught him, before he was finally detained and handed 
over to the police.7 
Mr. Mushrush was charged with three counts of inducing panic, fourth-degree 
felonies.  (Inducing panic is generally a first-degree misdemeanor, but the charges 
were elevated to fourth-degree felonies based on the physical harm to Ms. Hartman, 
Ms. Weber, and Mr. Weil.)8  Also, he was charged with a fifth-degree-felony count 
of assault for his push of Mr. Williamson.  (Assault is normally a misdemeanor, but 
because Mr. Williamson was a school administrator, it was elevated to a felony.)9   
Finally, he was charged with one count of felonious assault, a second-degree felony, 
for knowingly causing serious physical harm to Ms. Weber.10 
Mr. Mushrush initially pleaded not guilty.  But he later withdrew that plea and 
pleaded guilty to all the charges.  The court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced 
him to ten and a half years’ incarceration.  Eight years were for the felonious assault, 
which was the maximum sentence for that offense.  One year was for the assault, the 
maximum sentence for that offense.  The remaining one and a half years were for the 
inducing-panic counts—the court gave the maximum time for two of the panic 
counts, one and a half years, but the terms were to run concurrently.11 
On appeal, Mr. Mushrush argued that his sentence was excessive and that it 
violated the sentencing guidelines.  He claimed that the trial judge’s imposition of 
maximum jail time on the various counts was contrary to law.  He also claimed that 
the court should not have ordered him to serve consecutive jail time for the felonious 
assault, assault, and inducing-panic counts.12 
A three-judge panel decided the case.  One judge wrote a lead opinion, with 
another judge concurring in judgment only.  I dissented. 
The lead opinion held that the record supported the trial judge’s determination 
that Mr. Mushrush had committed the “worst forms” of the offenses, which made the 
imposition of maximum sentences permissible.13  The lead opinion also held that the 
trial judge’s imposition of consecutive sentences was permitted under the 
                                                                
5Id. 
6Id.  
7Id. 
8OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.31(C)(3) (Anderson 1996) (codified under R.C. 
§ 2917.31(C) when Mushrush committed the crimes). 
9OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13(2)(e). 
10Mushrush, 733 N.E.2d at 255-56. 
11The third inducing-panic count merged with the felonious-assault count.  Id. at 256. 
12Id. 
13Id. at 259; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14(C) (Anderson 1996). 
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guidelines.14  Its rationale for this holding was that Ms. Weber had been rendered 
unconscious as a result of Mr. Mushrush’s actions, that people could have been 
crushed, and that deaths could potentially have resulted.15  In coming to its 
conclusions, the lead opinion spoke of the importance of a trial judge’s discretion in 
sentencing: “Taking away judicial discretion entirely turns judges into clerks.  So 
long as the exercise of that discretion falls within the law, this court should not 
reverse a sentence, even if the sentence appears, as in the words of the sentencing 
judge in this case, ‘Draconian’ and ‘harsh.’”16  According to the lead opinion, the 
sentence could not be overturned unless the trial judge’s findings were “not 
supported by clear and convincing evidence.”17 
I disagreed with the decision and with the determination that the trial judge’s 
findings only needed to be supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Under 
Senate Bill 2, abuse of discretion is no longer the standard; and courts of appeals 
now have an affirmative duty under the law to scrutinize sentences for compliance 
with the guidelines.18  My dissent stressed that both the maximum sentence for 
felonious assault and the imposition of consecutive sentences for the various offenses 
were erroneous.19   
I took exception to the conclusion that Mr. Mushrush’s felonious assault on Ms. 
Weber was one of the “worst forms” of the offense.  No weapon was involved, Ms. 
Weber was treated at the scene, and she did not even have to go to the hospital.20  
Considering that felonious assaults normally involve much more severe actions and 
consequences—things such as beating someone with a baseball bat or even shooting 
someone—I determined that Mr. Mushrush clearly did not commit the worst form of 
the offense, stating “[w]e may not be able to define what is not the ‘worst form’ of 
an offense, but we must know it when we see it.  What we may not do is pretend to 
be blind.”21  Especially appalling was the fact that offenders in numerous more 
serious felonious assault cases had been sentenced under Senate Bill 2 to less prison 
time than the time received by Mr. Mushrush.22   
                                                                
14Mushrush, 733 N.E.2d at 261-62; R.C. § 2929.14(E)(4). 
15Mushrush, 733 N.E.2d at 261.  
16Id. at 259. 
17Id. 
18Id. at 265 (Painter, J., dissenting). 
19Id. at 264 (Painter, J., dissenting).   
20Id. at 263 (Painter, J., dissenting). 
21Id. at 266 (Painter, J., dissenting). 
22Id. & n.17 (Painter, J., dissenting); State v. Palmer, No. C-980437, 1999 WL 235618 
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999) (repeatedly stabbing with a butcher knife: four years 
incarceration); State v. Day, No. C-971079, 1998 WL 735375 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1998) 
(concurrent sentences of two years incarceration for two counts of felonious assault, but case 
remanded for resentencing); State v. Campbell, No. C-970125, 1997 WL 778994 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 19, 1997) (assault in connection with a burglary: three years incarceration on a 
felonious-assault count); State v. Gales, 721 N.E.2d 497 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (shooting 
victim in head: concurrent sentences of four years incarceration for two counts of felonious 
assault); State v. Van Deusen, No. 2831-M, 1999 WL 239896 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1999) 
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Mr. Mushrush deserved to be punished.  But ten and a half years’ incarceration 
for a mace-spraying eighteen-year-old kid was completely out of proportion.23  Since 
one purpose of Senate Bill 2 was to help equalize sentences, this case was an 
indication to me that it had failed.  
Indeed, the Mushrush case—a case that received a fair amount of publicity, 
which is somewhat unusual for our court24—indicates that courts, and even judges 
within the same court, are far from agreement over certain aspects of the new 
sentencing guidelines.  Now that it has been more than four years since Senate Bill 2 
became effective, this is a good time to analyze the cases to see where courts stand in 
their interpretations of the guidelines.  This article will review the case law and show 
how different courts have dealt with the legislation.  My analysis concentrates on one 
aspect of the guidelines in particular: the standard of review that appeals courts have 
used to determine the propriety of sentences.  To illustrate my points, I focus on the 
issue of when judges can impose maximum prison sentences under the guidelines, 
one of the most frequently litigated issues before our court.  After initially analyzing 
the origins and development of Senate Bill 2, I will show that courts have not used 
consistent standards of review.  This inconsistency, I argue, is especially problematic 
because it will result in inconsistent sentences for convicted felons, whose sentences 
                                                          
(beating victim by slamming head into car: one year incarceration); State v. Bair, No. 72281, 
1999 WL 195659 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1999) (repeatedly striking victim in back of head: 
seven years incarceration); State v. Mullins, No. L-98-1059, 1998 WL 904926 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 31, 1998) (striking victim’s face and body to facilitate a robbery: seven years 
incarceration); State v. Wagle, No. L-98-1127, 1998 WL 904952 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 
1998) (repeatedly hitting victim with baseball bat and kicking her before kidnapping her: five 
years incarceration on a felonious-assault count); State v. Drake, No. 98AP-448, 1998 WL 
890169 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1998) (placing gun to victim’s head and knocking her down: 
three years incarceration on a felonious-assault count, but case remanded for resentencing); 
State v. Keeton, No. 98 CA 13, 1998 WL 852943 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1998) (striking 
victim three times with a support stand for a bumper jack: five years incarceration); State v. 
Brooks, No. 97APA11-1543, 1998 WL 514111 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1998) (beating victim 
with a car door: five years incarceration, but case remanded for resentencing); State v. Lytle, 
No. 97 CA 100, 1998 WL 429845 (Ohio Ct. App. July 31, 1998) (striking victim, causing a 
fracture of the left cheek, tripod bone, and orbital floor: three years incarceration); State v. 
Jaap, No. 18711, 1998 WL 332948 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1998) (attacking a victim with a 
shovel during a “road rage” incident, causing a broken shoulder and severe lacerations to 
victim’s head: three years incarceration); State v. Davis, No. 72820, 1998 WL 323611 (Ohio 
Ct. App. June 18, 1998) (assault with a golf club, causing “multiple contusion status post 
assault”: two years incarceration, but case remanded for resentencing); State v. Blondheim, 
No. 18594, 1998 WL 281917 (Ohio Ct. App. May 27, 1998) (shaking baby, causing “retinal 
hemorrhages” and brain swelling: five years incarceration on a felonious-assault count); State 
v. Wilson, No. L-97-1197, 1998 WL 196283 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 17, 1998) (beating wife, 
causing a broken nose and contusions to her head, face, extremities, and left shoulder: five 
years incarceration); State v. Longmire, No. 97-P-0032, 1998 WL 156895 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Mar. 27, 1998) (striking victim with wine bottle, causing serious damage to victim’s jaw: five 
years incarceration).    
23Id. at 263 (Painter, J., dissenting). 
24See, e.g., Kimball Perry, Ruehlman’s Sentence ‘Travesty,’ Painter Says, CINCINNATI 
POST, June 19, 1999, at A1; Dan Horn, Judges Argue 10½-Year Sentence for Spraying Mace, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 19, 1999, at B7.  
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will be greatly influenced by the section of the state, or appellate district, where their 
crimes occurred—just what Senate Bill 2 was designed to avoid.  
I.  SENATE BILL 2 
In August 1995, Governor George Voinovich signed into law Senate Bill 2, the 
first comprehensive revision of Ohio’s criminal code in more than twenty years.  
When it took effect on July 1, 1996, Senate Bill 2 completely overhauled Ohio’s 
sentencing system.25 
The bill was partly the result of growing concerns about prison overcrowding and 
the increasing need for additional prison space.  Also, there was a notion that 
offenders received disparate sentences for the same crime in different sections of the 
state. 26   
Senate Bill 2’s legislative history began with the creation of the Ohio Criminal 
Sentencing Commission.  Chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, and including representatives from various aspects of the Ohio Bar, such as 
prosecutors and defense attorneys, the Commission was instructed to develop a 
sentencing policy “designed to enhance public safety by achieving certainty in 
sentencing, deterrence, and a reasonable use of correctional facilities, programs, and 
services” and to “achieve fairness in sentencing.”27  To reach such an end, the 
proposed policy was to provide for the following: sentences proportional to the 
seriousness of the offenses and the criminal histories of the offenders; procedures to 
ensure the imposition of uniform penalties for similar offenses and to match criminal 
penalties with available correctional services; a structure to control the use and 
duration of a full range of sentencing options; and retention of reasonable judicial 
discretion in applying that structure.28 
Senate Bill 2 was the product of the Commission’s recommendations to the 121st 
General Assembly in 1993.29  All of its major proposals were included in the final 
draft of the legislation.  This legislation has made significant changes in Ohio’s 
previous sentencing structure.30  For one thing, it is based on “truth in sentencing,” 
the principle that the penalty that a judge imposes will be the penalty that is actually 
served, unless the judge changes it.31  Under the new guidelines, with limited 
exceptions, indefinite prison terms are abolished.  Judges are now required to impose 
definite terms.32  Credit for “good time,” which automatically reduced the minimum 
                                                                
25BURT W. GRIFFIN & LEWIS R. KATZ, OHIO FELONY SENTENCING LAW 1 (1998). 
26Id. at 501. 
27Id. at 502 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 181.23(B)). 
28Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 181.24(B)). 
29A Plan for Felony Sentencing in Ohio:  A Formal Report of the Ohio Criminal 
Sentencing Commission (1993). 
30GRIFFIN & KATZ, supra note 25, at 2; ROBERT H. GORMAN & AMY B. BRANN, Senate Bill 
2 and Senate Bill 269 Outline 279 app. (Anderson’s Ohio Criminal Practice and Procedure 
1997). 
31GRIFFIN & KATZ, supra note 25, at 14. 
32See GORMAN & BRANN, supra note 30, at 279. 
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term of indefinite sentences, is eliminated.33  And the power of the Ohio Parole Board 
has been reduced.  Where previously the Parole Board had the power to review and 
modify sentences, the primary sentencing power now remains with the courts.34     
To facilitate review, Senate Bill 2 attempts to provide enforceable sentencing 
guidelines.  Appellate review of sentences, a hallmark of Senate Bill 2, is intended to 
ensure that offenders are sentenced consistently. 
II.  FRAMEWORK 
The framework of Senate Bill 2 is detailed, with an enumerated list of principles 
and presumptions, required considerations, and prison-term guidelines that must be 
followed by judges.  No individual provision of the act may be read alone.  Sections 
2929.11 to 2929.14, when read together, provide the structure for felony sentencing, 
while appellate review serves to ensure that each sentence meets the legislation’s 
requirements. 
Section 2929.11, which is the key to the new sentencing standards, is where the 
sentencing process itself must begin.  It contains two overriding purposes with which 
all criminal sentences must comport:  (1) to protect the public by preventing future 
crime and (2) to punish offenders.35  To achieve these purposes, a court should select 
an appropriate sanction by considering the need for incapacitation, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and restitution.36  A sentence imposed for a felony must be 
proportional to the seriousness of the offense and its impact on the victim, and it 
must be consistent with sentences for offenders in similar situations.37   
Under section 2929.12, a court retains discretion to determine the most effective 
way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.  In exercising this 
discretion, the court is required to consider a series of factors that pertain to the 
seriousness of the offense and the recidivism of the offender.  These factors include 
the injuries suffered by the victim,38  the motivations of the offender,39 the offender’s 
prior convictions,40 the offender’s remorse,41 and any mitigating factors.42 
Only after taking account of these initial considerations may a court proceed to 
decide whether to imprison the offender and, if so, for what length of time.  Section 
2929.14 provides ranges of prison terms from which a judge is to select, based upon 
the degree of felony.43  The section also outlines other conditions that a judge may 
                                                                
33GORMAN & BRANN, supra note 30, at 280; GRIFFIN & KATZ, supra note 25, at 14-15. 
34GORMAN & BRANN, supra note 30, at 280; GRIFFIN & KATZ, supra note 25, at 16. 
35OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11(A) (Anderson 1996). 
36Id. 
37§ 2929.11(B). 
38OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(B)(1). 
39§ 2929.12(B)(8). 
40§ 2929.12(D)(2). 
41§ 2929.12(D)(5). 
42§ 2929.12(C)(4). 
43§ 2929.14(A). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/6
1999] APPELLATE REVIEW UNDER THE NEW FELONY SENTENCING 539 
impose on an offender, such as when the offender can be given a maximum sentence 
of incarceration.  Where the offender has not served a previous prison term, the court 
is to impose the shortest term authorized for the offense, unless the court finds, on 
the record, that “this will demean the seriousness of the offender’s conduct” or “not 
adequately protect the public.”44  Maximum time is reserved for offenders who have 
committed the “worst forms of the offense” or for those who pose the “greatest 
likelihood of committing future crimes,” and for certain major drug offenders or 
repeat violent offenders.45  
Before sentencing an offender, a judge is required to hold a sentencing hearing 
and to make findings.46  The judge must consider the record, the testimony of any 
person presenting information, and, if one has been prepared, the pre-sentence 
investigation report.47 If a defendant appeals his sentence, an appeals court may 
modify, vacate, or remand the sentence if it “clearly and convincingly” finds that the 
record does not support the sentencing court’s findings or that the sentence is 
otherwise contrary to law.48 
III.  WHERE DO WE STAND? 
Under the new guidelines, many trial judges had—and still have—difficulty 
adjusting to the changes in the laws.  The judges, who were used to the wide 
discretion afforded to them before Senate Bill 2, have been frustrated with the more 
rigid guidelines imposed on them under the new sentencing framework.  In 
sentencing a defendant before him, one judge proclaimed what were surely the 
feelings of many of his peers: 
I think Senate Bill Two . . . is a violation of separation of powers.  The 
legislature wants to tell me how to do my job, and I don’t think that’s 
appropriate. . . .  My position is that it’s unconstitutional, a violation of 
separation of powers, and that the legislators are elected to perform proper 
legislative functions.  They are not elected to dictate to me how I do my 
job and what considerations that I must take into account before imposing 
sentence.49 
On appeal, the court stated that it fully understood the trial judge’s frustration.  But 
the court, which concluded that the judge had ordered a harsh sentence based on his 
                                                                
44§ 2929.14(B). 
45§ 2929.14(C). 
46OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.19(A); but see State v. Edmonson, 715 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio 
1999), syllabus (“R.C. 2929.14(B) does not require that the trial court give its reasons for its 
finding that the seriousness of the offender’s conduct will be demeaned or that the public will 
not be adequately protected from future crimes before it can lawfully impose more than the 
minimum authorized sentence.”). 
47§ 2929.19(B)(1). 
48OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.08(G)(2). 
49State v. Grant, No. 97APA12-1673, 1998 WL 514131, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 18, 
1998).   
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displeasure with the legislature, reversed and remanded for resentencing because the 
judge had not complied with the guidelines.50 
In the time since Senate Bill 2 became effective, courts have helped refine the 
law and clarify various issues that may not have been readily apparent from the 
language of the guidelines themselves.  For instance, regarding the requirement that 
maximum sentences may only be imposed on offenders who have committed the 
“worst forms of the offense,”51 courts have attempted to clarify what that phrase 
means.  Although the term “worst forms” can never be defined with precision as the 
very concept of the worst form of an offense is nebulous, courts have consistently 
stressed that because the word “form” is phrased in the plural, the legislature 
recognized that more than one scenario for which a given offense can qualify.52  
Since it may always be possible for a court to envision a worse scenario than the one 
before it, this makes sense.  Otherwise, no defendant would ever be sentenced to 
maximum time under the “worst forms” clause. 
Another instance of clarification, and perhaps the most important, is that courts 
have consistently stressed the necessity of following the framework set forth by the 
legislature.  The courts are not hesitant to reverse sentences where trial judges did 
not properly state their findings or where judges sentenced offenders based on 
factors not set forth in the guidelines.  By way of example, in a First District case, 
State v. Johnson, an offender guilty of three counts of theft had failed to appear at his 
original sentencing hearing.53  As punishment for not showing up, the trial judge 
imposed consecutive sentences on two of the counts.  On appeal, we empathized 
with the judge’s decision and stated that we would have prefered that the judge had 
the discretion to punish the offender for his failure to appear.  But, under the 
sentencing guidelines, punishment for failure to appear at a sentencing hearing is not 
a factor for imposing consecutive sentences.  Because the sentence in Johnson was 
not based on the appropriate predicate factors for imposing consecutive sentences, 
we reversed.54   
Other issues under Senate Bill 2, though, are not as straightforward.  One issue, 
in particular, involves the degree of review that appeals courts need to give to 
sentences.  This was an area where the legislature initially provided little guidance.  
As a result, case law on the issue was not consistent. 
The debate regarding appellate review was whether appeals courts should have 
applied a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing trial courts’ 
                                                                
50Id. 
51R.C. § 2929.14(C). 
52See, e.g., State v. Simpson, No. CA99-07-078, 2000 WL 342135, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Apr. 3, 2000); State v. Garrard, 707 N.E.2d 546, 548-51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Pickford, No. 97-JE-21, 1999 WL 126931, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1999); State v. 
Kershaw, 724 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); State v. Dunwoody, No. 97CA11, 
1998 WL 513606, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1998); see also State v. Moore, No. 19544, 
2000 WL 422412, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2000) (“worst forms” is not 
unconstitutionally vague). 
53State v. Johnson, Nos. C-980013 & C-980014, 1998 WL 735409 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 
1998). 
54Id.  
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/6
1999] APPELLATE REVIEW UNDER THE NEW FELONY SENTENCING 541 
sentences, or whether the courts should have applied a more stringent standard.  
Initially after Senate Bill 2 was enacted, courts did not seem to pay much attention to 
the subject.  Appellate courts, probably out of habit, mentioned the discretion of trial 
judges without ever really analyzing the significance of their words under the new 
framework.  In fact, at one time or another, appeals courts from every district 
suggested that there was an abuse-of-discretion standard.55  But gradually a split 
emerged.56  Some courts maintained that abuse of discretion was the proper standard 
of review, while others rejected the abuse-of-discretion standard.   
This split was recently resolved by the legislature, which, effective October 10, 
2000, amended the appellate review section of the sentencing guidelines to state, 
“[t]he appellate court’s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court 
abused its discretion.”57  The amendment is a key step to ending the inconsistent 
treatment that defendants were receiving in appellate districts throughout the state.  
But I predict that appellate courts will continue to take differing approaches to 
sentencing review. 
A.  Abuse-of-Discretion Standard 
Prior to the amendment, the appellate courts that maintained an abuse-of-
discretion standard focused on the section of the guidelines that outlines the 
seriousness and recidivism factors for sentencing.  That section states that a 
sentencing court “has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with 
the purposes and principles of sentencing” set forth in the guidelines.58  According to 
the courts, the discretion of trial judges was somewhat limited in that Senate Bill 2 
provided a framework that judges were constrained to follow in sentencing 
offenders.  But the courts held that, as long as sentencing judges acted within the 
framework, the sentencing judges had broad discretion in coming to their 
conclusions.59  One court referred to the framework of Senate Bill 2 as a “statutory 
                                                                
55See generally, e.g., State v. Richmond, No. C-970518, 1998 WL 107653 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Mar. 13, 1998); State v. Church, No. 98 CA 36, 1999 WL 252399 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30, 
1999); State v. Jones, No. 2-98-1, 1998 WL 405906 (Ohio Ct. App. July 22, 1998); State v. 
Sams, No. 98 CA 13, 1999 WL 1598 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1998); State v. Laird, No. 1997 
CA 00211, 1998 WL 347105 (Ohio Ct. App. June 15, 1998); State v. Collignon, No. L-97-
1189, 1998 WL 161012 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1998); State v. Piergiovanni, No. 97 C.A. 14, 
1998 WL 775010 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 20, 1998); State v. Byrd, No. 72795, 1999 WL 148468 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1999); State v. Wooden, No. 18448, 1998 WL 78674 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Feb. 11, 1998); State v. Epley, Nos. 97APA11-1467 & 97APA11-1468, 1998 WL 542694 
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1998); State v. Wilson, No. 98-L-267, 2000 WL 688724 (Ohio Ct. 
App. May 26, 2000); State v. Stewart, No. CA96-12-057, 1997 WL 716887 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Nov. 17, 1997).  
56See State v. Hamilton, No. 1474, 1999 WL 301484, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 14, 1999) 
(“Courts have disagreed whether, by enacting Am. Sub. S.B. 2, the legislature changed the 
‘abuse of discretion’ standard traditionally applied in reviewing sentencing decisions.”). 
57OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.08(G)(2) (Ohio 1999). 
58§ 2929.12(A). 
59See, e.g., State v. Northam, Nos. 98AP-184 & 98AP-185, 1998 WL 655411, at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1998). 
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definition of abuse of discretion.”60  Abuse of discretion was the standard under the 
old sentencing law,61 and these courts concluded that Senate Bill 2 did not change 
it.62  Old ways die hard. 
Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, an appellant has a very high burden to 
obtain a reversal.  An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment.  
It implies that the trial court’s attitude is “unreasonable, arbitrary or 
unconscionable.”63  For the appellate courts that continued to apply an abuse-of-
discretion standard, error was found when judges had not sentenced offenders in 
accordance with Senate Bill 2’s framework, such as in cases where judges had not 
made any findings. 
But in the cases where judges had acted properly within the framework, no 
reviewing court using the abuse-of-discretion standard reversed a sentence based 
upon an abuse of discretion, at least regarding the imposition of the maximum term.  
No court, for instance, held that a judge abused his or her discretion in sentencing an 
offender to maximum prison time based on a determination that the offender 
committed the “worst forms of the offense.”  And no court found that a trial judge 
abused his or her discretion in finding that the offender posed the “greatest likelihood 
of committing future crimes.” 
The case coming closest to a reversal of a sentence based on abuse of discretion 
was one that involved an offender who raped and kidnapped his victim, and stole two 
dollars from her apartment as he left.64 The trial judge sentenced the offender to 
maximum jail time for the theft of the two dollars, which was charged as a robbery.  
The judge based the sentence on a determination that the robbery had caused the 
victim serious physical and psychological harm.  But, on appeal, the court 
determined that the rape and kidnapping, not the robbery, had caused the physical 
and psychological harm, because the victim was not aware of the theft until after the 
attack.  Thus, the appeals court suggested that the trial court had abused its discretion 
on the sentence for the robbery.  The court, though, held that any error was harmless: 
the robbery sentence was concurrent with the sentences for the other counts, and its 
length did not affect the overall time that the offender would spend in jail.65 
In short, courts were reluctant to find abuses of discretion in sentencing.  But not 
all courts applied that standard. 
                                                                
60State v. Dunwoody, No. 97CA11, 1998 WL 513606, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1998). 
61See, e.g., State v. Polick, 655 N.E.2d 820, 821 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
62See, e.g., State v. Persons, No. 98 CA 19, 1999 WL 253527, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 
26, 1999); see also State v. Assad, Nos. 72648 & 72649, 1998 WL 308109, at *3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. June 11, 1998). 
63State v. Adams, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ohio 1980).  Our court has suggested a better 
definition: an abuse of discretion implies that “there is no sound reasoning process” that would 
support a court’s decision. State v. Echols, No. 716 N.E.2d 728, 744 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); see 
also State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n.18 (Ariz. 1983). 
64State v. Avery, 709 N.E.2d 875 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
65Id. at 885. 
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B.  The Plain-Language Approach 
The First District took the lead in specifically rejecting the abuse-of-discretion 
standard, a lead that at least four other districts followed.66  In State v. Sheppard, we 
specifically stressed that we no longer reviewed sentencing under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.67  Instead, we followed the plain language of the sentencing 
guidelines that deals with appellate review of sentences.  The section covering 
appellate review specifically states that an appeals court can modify, vacate, or 
remand a sentence if it “clearly and convincingly” finds that the record does not 
support the sentence or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.68   
In the Sheppard case, the defendant, Scott Sheppard, was found guilty of 
attempted aggravated arson for setting a fire in a trash can at the University of 
Cincinnati and was sentenced to five years’ incarceration, the maximum time for the 
offense.69  The sentence was based on the trial judge’s conclusion that Mr. Sheppard 
posed the “greatest likelihood of recidivism.”70  But, on review, we explained that 
Mr. Sheppard’s only prior conviction was for solicitation, which did not indicate in 
any way the likelihood that he would attempt to set another fire.  We also stressed 
that little damage was done by the fire and that, contrary to the trial judge’s finding, 
Mr. Sheppard did not set the fire because he was motivated by prejudice based on 
sexual preference.71  (Mr. Sheppard had set the fire to hinder another person from 
pursuing him for sexual favors, not because he was prejudiced against that person.)  
Based on these factors, we clearly and convincingly found that the record did not 
support the trial judge’s sentence.  We reduced Mr. Sheppard’s prison term to one 
year, the minimum sentence for the crime.72  In a concurrence, I stated that we would 
not “hesitate to do our duty” in reviewing sentences for compliance with the 
guidelines.73 
Following the Sheppard case, we continued to affirmatively review sentences.  In 
most cases, we affirmed the sentences because we did not clearly and convincingly 
find that the sentences were not supported by the record—i.e., under the definition of 
“clear and convincing,” we did not have a “firm belief or conviction” that the 
sentences were not supported by the record.74  But, when merited, sentences were 
                                                                
66See State v. Simpson, No. CA99-07-078, 2000 WL 342135, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 
2000); State v. Gibbons, No. 1998CA00158, 2000 WL 502694, at *15 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 
30, 2000); State v. Pickford, No. 97-JE-21, 1999 WL 126931, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 22, 
1999); State v. Cruz, No. F-97-023, 1998 WL 102195, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1998). 
67State v. Sheppard, 705 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); cf. State v. Assad, Nos. 
72648 & 72649, 1998 WL 308109, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 11, 1998). 
68§ 2953.08(G)(2). 
69Sheppard, 705 N.E.2d at 412. 
70Id. at 413. 
71Id. 
72Id. at 413-14. 
73Id. at 414 (Painter, J., concurring). 
74Cross v. Ledford, 120 N.E.2d 118, ¶ 3 of the syllabus (Ohio 1954) (defining “clear and 
convincing” as a “degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ 
but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ . . ., and 
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reversed or modified.  In State v. Howard, another case where a judge found that the 
offender posed the “greatest likelihood of recidivism,” we explained that the 
legislature’s use of the term “greatest” in the sentencing guidelines signified its 
intent to limit maximum prison terms “to the most incorrigible offenders.”75  The 
offender in Howard had been convicted of three counts of felony nonsupport of a 
dependent, and the trial judge had sentenced him to maximum time, twelve months, 
on each count, to be served consecutively.  In our review of the record, we found that 
the offender had no criminal history, that he was employed at the time of his 
sentencing hearing, and that he wanted to support his children but had failed to do so 
because of an injury.  We concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
sentencing finding.  We also concluded that the judge had not complied with the 
guidelines in ordering consecutive sentences, and we modified the offender’s 
sentence to eleven months on each count, to be served concurrently.76 
More recently, in State v. Kershaw, we reversed a sentence because the trial 
judge had improperly found that the offender had committed one of the “worst forms 
of the offense.”77  Delores Kershaw was at her residence in November 1997, when, 
in the early morning hours, a woman named Leona Anderson came looking for Ms. 
Kershaw’s brother.  Ms. Anderson was intoxicated and yelled obscenities outside the 
residence.  After Ms. Kershaw called the police, Ms. Anderson left.  Ms. Anderson 
returned at 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning.  Ms. Kershaw took a gun and fired a warning 
shot to frighten Ms. Anderson.  Ms. Kershaw then pursued Ms. Anderson onto a 
neighbor’s yard, and when Ms. Anderson began advancing toward her, she fired 
another shot in Ms. Anderson’s direction.  Ms. Anderson said that she did not fear 
the gun and continued to advance.  Finally, Ms. Kershaw fired a third shot that killed 
Ms. Anderson.78 
Ms. Kershaw was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.  The trial judge found 
that she had committed the worst form of the offense and sentenced her to ten years’ 
incarceration, the maximum time, plus three years’ incarceration on a gun 
specification.  On appeal, however, we held that the facts in the record did not 
support the conclusion that the case involved one of the worst forms of the offense.  
The decision stressed that Ms. Anderson had threatened Ms. Kershaw at Ms. 
Kershaw’s own residence, and that Ms. Kershaw had attempted to contact the police 
before she resorted to violence.  We also noted that the crime did not involve torture 
or other aggravating circumstances.  We concluded that, although Ms. Kershaw’s 
retrieval of the gun and her threats to shoot Ms. Anderson suggested a degree of 
premeditation, “that circumstance alone [did] not render this the worst form of the 
offense.”79  Therefore, we reversed the sentence.  One of the judges on the appellate 
panel dissented.  He stated, among other things, that Ms. Kershaw’s threats to use the 
                                                          
which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts 
sought to be established”). 
75State v. Howard, No. C-971049, 1998 WL 597651, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1998). 
76Id. at *4. 
77State v. Kershaw, 724 N.E.2d 1176 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). 
78Id. at 1177-78. 
79Id. at 1179. 
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gun and her pursuit of Ms. Anderson were sufficient reasons for the sentencing judge 
to have concluded that this was one of the worst forms of the offense.80   
Most recently, in State v. Mays, we reversed a maximum sentence in an 
aggravated vehicular homicide case.81  The defendant in that case, the driver of an 
automobile, had intended to “mess with” the victim, a pedestrian, by “nudging” him 
with the automobile.  But, instead of merely nudging the victim, the defendant had 
inadvertantly run over him.82  In reversing the imposition of a maximum sentence, 
we stressed that, although the defendant had exercised extremely poor judgment, our 
review of the record revealed that the defendant’s conduct did not constitute one of 
the worst forms of the offense.  We concluded that there was no indication that the 
defendant harbored any malice toward the victim.  We stated that the record 
indicated that the defendant’s conduct “started as a reckless, poorly conceived prank 
and ended in tragedy,” and then added, “[w]hile we in no way wish to minimize the 
loss of a human life or to condone [the defendant’s] actions, this is not the type of 
conduct for which the legislature has reserved the maximum sentence.”83  Further, 
we stressed that the defendant took steps to get emergency help for the victim and 
that the defendant surrendered to authorities and confessed to the crime.84 
In a dissent, one judge on the appellate panel stated that the defendant’s conduct 
could have constituted one of the worst forms of the offense.  The dissent stated that, 
because the “worst form” of an offense is a vague concept, great deference should be 
given to the trial court’s findings.  The dissent then stressed the senselessness of the 
victim’s death and that the defendant had compounded the offense by leaving the 
scene of the collision before calling for emergency aid.85 
The dissents in Kershaw and Mays, as well as my dissent in Mushrush, exemplify 
the disagreements that have arisen regarding the interpretation of the sentencing 
guidelines.86  Because the guidelines contain certain ambiguous terms—and 
concepts—such as “worst forms of the offense”—these disagreements are not 
surprising.  But, ultimately, certain fundamental disagreements should be resolved to 
achieve more consistency in sentencing.   
IV.  WHAT’S NEXT? 
With the recent amendment to the sentencing guidelines that an “appellate court’s 
standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion,” the 
                                                                
80Id. at 1182 (Hildebrandt, J., dissenting). 
81State v. Mays, No. C-000003, 2000 WL 1033098 (Ohio Ct. App. July 28, 2000) (also 
reversing consecutive sentences).  See also State v. Green, No. C-990771, 2000 WL 1235960 
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2000) (holding that the record did not support the trial court’s finding 
that the offender posed the “greatest” risk of recidivism). 
82Id. at *1. 
83Id. at *2. 
84Id. 
85Id. at *3 (Hildebrandt, P.J., dissenting). 
86See also State v. Shackelford, No. C-980980, 1999 WL 1263520 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 
30, 1999) (Painter, J., dissenting) (arguing that a “get-away driver” charged with robbery did 
not commit the worst form of the offense). 
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debate is over regarding whether abuse of discretion remains the standard of review.  
The legislature has clearly indicated that appeals courts must actively review 
sentences, not merely defer to the determinations of trial judges.  Because a primary 
purpose of Senate Bill 2 is to eliminate disparate sentencing for similar offenses, it 
seems only logical that appellate courts must take a more active role in reviewing 
sentences than that allowed under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.  A 
more active review process is the only effective way to ensure that trial judges are 
properly and consistently applying the guidelines.87  Otherwise, Senate Bill 2, which 
was intended to overhaul felony sentencing with appellate courts playing an active 
role in ensuring consistency, would be meaningless.   
But the debate is not necessarily over.  Although it is clear that abuse-of-
discretion is no longer the standard of review, an issue still remains regarding how 
intense the standard of review should be—will it be on the deferential end of the 
continuum, or will it be on the other end, such as a de novo review?  Admittedly, my 
court has not been consistent.  Some cases have stated that there is no de novo 
review,88 while other cases have suggested the opposite.89  Possibly in the near 
future, this issue will be resolved.  Certainly the bench, bar, and citizens of Ohio 
have a right to know. 
V.  AFTERWORD 
As things turned out, Mr. Mushrush ended up serving less than two years of his 
sentence.  Though Mr. Mushrush was not eligible for judicial release, in an arguably 
prohibited—but not appealed—procedure, the trial judge had Mr. Mushrush 
withdraw his original guilty plea and plead guilty again to the felonious assault, 
assault, and inducing panic charges.  The judge then sentenced him to five years of 
probation and drug monitoring before releasing him. This was done after Mr. 
Mushrush’s attorney questioned the trial judge concerning the judge’s cousin’s 
possible involvement in the original case.90 
While some might say that the “system works” because the trial judge eventually 
relented and released Mr. Mushrush (though he was not eligible for judicial release), 
the later proceeding here only illustrates the problem of the appellate court’s refusal 
                                                                
87Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of Law in Federal Guidelines Sentencing: 
Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake of Koon v. United States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1697, 1703 (1998) (stating in regard to the federal sentencing guidelines that “appellate review 
was conceived as a crucial mechanism for promoting consistency and fairness by aiding in the 
evolution of sentencing doctrine on which judges could rely when making sentencing 
decisions”).   
88See State v. Shyrock, No. C-96111, 1997 WL 1008672, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 
1997); Shackelford, 1999 WL 1263520, at *2; see also State v. Mushrush, 733 N.E.2d 252 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1999). 
89See State v. Kershaw, 724 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (1999); State v. Goetz, No. C-970503, 
1998 WL 735358, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1998); State v. Richmond, No. C-970518, 
1998 WL 107653, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1998). 
90See Kimball Perry, Ruehlman Sets Teen Free Early, CINCINNATI POST, June 22, 2000, at 
14A, available at <http://www.cincypost.com/news/ruehl062200.html>; Kimball Perry, Judge 
Sets Free Teen who Disrupted School Talent Show, CINCINNATI POST, June 20, 2000, at 9A, 
available at <http://www.cincypost.com/news/mush061900.html>. 
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to act.  If the appellate court had done its job, there would have been no need to 
resort to legal legerdemain to right this wrong. 
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